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Counteracting Hate Speech as a Way of
Preventing Genocidal Violence
Wibke Timmermann
PhD candidate, Irish Centre for Human Rights,
National University of Ireland, Galway
Hate speech regularly, if not inevitably, precedes and accompanies ethnic conflicts,
and particularly genocidal violence. Without such incitement to hatred and the
exacerbation of xenophobic, anti-Semitic, or racist tendencies, no genocide would be
possible and persecutory campaigns would rarely meet with a sympathetic response
in the general public.
In order to successfully prevent genocidal crimes and violence, therefore, it is
indispensable to effectively address the problem of systematic incitement to hatred.
While less virulent forms of hate speech may be adequately addressed by humanrights law obligations on governments to prohibit such acts, vicious, systematic,
and state-organized hate propaganda should be criminalized under international
law. Before discussing how hate speech can be treated as an international crime,
this article assesses the most important justifications for proscribing hate speech,
including the need to protect the human dignity and equality rights of the victims of
such speech as well as the need to protect the public peace and the dangers of hate
speech in that it may contribute to the creation of a climate of hatred and violence
directed against a specific group. The article supports treating systematic
incitement to hatred as a form of persecution, an approach recently upheld by the
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Such an
approach most adequately reflects the nature of hate speech and the motivations
underlying its criminalization, while also respecting the important right to freedom
of speech.
Keywords: hate speech, persecution, genocide, freedom of speech, human dignity

Introduction: The Role of Hate Propaganda in Preparing the Ground
for Genocides and Mass Violence
Hate speech is an integral part of any state-organized persecution and serves to
psychologically prepare the population of a state for certain crimes planned by its
leaders. It has therefore been recognized—particularly in the years since the Rwandan
Genocide—that the presence of hate propaganda may indicate an impending genocide
or, at least, impending violence and conflict.
Thus, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) has issued a decision on the subject of early-warning procedures, in this
case elaborating a ‘‘special set of indicators related to genocide’’ that would allow the
committee ‘‘to detect and prevent at the earliest possible stage developments in racial
discrimination that may lead to violent conflict and genocide.’’1 The committee
explained that the list of indicators would allow it to evaluate the presence of ‘‘factors
known to be important components of situations leading to conflict and genocide.’’2
Two of the indicators mentioned are of particular relevance: first, the ‘‘[s]ystematic and
widespread use and acceptance of speech or propaganda promoting hatred and/or
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inciting violence against minority groups, particularly in the media,’’ and, second,
‘‘[g]rave statements by political leaders/prominent people that express support for
affirmation of superiority of a race or an ethnic group, dehumanization and
demonization of minorities, or condone or justify violence against a minority.’’3
It is well documented that major genocides of the twentieth century, such as the
Holocaust and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994,4 were preceded and prepared by
extensive hate propaganda, a major technique of which was the dehumanization of the
intended victims. In Germany, hate speech played a major role in the creation of a
persecutory climate that, together with other persecutory measures, prepared
the ground for the Shoah, as the District Court of Jerusalem acknowledged in the
Eichmann case when it stated that ‘‘[o]ut of this soil of hatred for the Jews grew the
actions of the Accused.’’5 Hitler was well aware of the powers of propaganda and,
together with Joseph Goebbels, the ‘‘master manipulator of crowds,’’6 exploited it to the
fullest. Goebbels himself recognized the influence of the radio, without which
he believed it would be impossible for the Nazis to seize and hold onto total power;
he described the radio as the ‘‘first and most influential intermediary between [. . .]
movement and nation, between idea and man,’’7 and claimed that ‘‘films constitute one
of the most modern and scientific means of influencing the masses.’’8 He was proved
right when, after seeing the propaganda film Jud Süß, which, while not directly calling
for the murder of Jews, was nonetheless intended to prepare the German public for
exactly that,9 some people were so frantic that they left the Berlin cinemas ‘‘screaming
curses at the Jews: ‘Drive the Jews from the Kurfürstendamm! Kick the last Jews out
of Germany!’’’10
Fifty years later, in Rwanda, symbolic language was used to stigmatize and
dehumanize the Tutsi ‘‘by attributing to [them] a set of characteristic labels, each one
more horrific than the next: cockroach, feudal lord, snake, subversive, enemy.’’11 This
rejection of the Tutsi minority from the Rwandan community was achieved, moreover,
by depicting them as ‘‘une race irre´me´diablement dominatrice et comploteuse dont la
force de nuisance transcende les frontie`res, au de´triment de Hutu voue´s au rôle de
victimes.’’12 These characterizations created a climate of fear in which the Hutu were
convinced of the need to take pre-emptive action in order to defend themselves.13
The specific danger of hate speech lies in the fact that, by dehumanizing and
denigrating the victim group, it begins a ‘‘continuum of destruction.’’14 This is achieved
mainly by separating and excluding the victims from the community of humankind
or the ‘‘human commonwealth.’’ The victims are treated as an ‘‘out-group,’’ and
hate speech thus builds an insurmountable wall between the victim group and
those remaining in the ‘‘in-group,’’ rendering sentiments of empathy or identification
with the victims impossible.15 Metaphors comparing the victimized group to insects or
disease-carrying animals regularly accompany the dehumanization: in Rwanda, the
Tutsi were called inyenzi, or cockroaches.16 This contributes to the creation of the
climate of violence, as Jonathan Glover explains: ‘‘[s]uch images and metaphors create
a psychological aura or tone which [. . .] may be at least as important as explicit beliefs
which can be criticized as untrue.’’17 Similarly, David Kretzmer argues that such
hostile beliefs are a ‘‘necessary condition’’ for racist acts.18 The capacity of human
beings to convince themselves that others (the members of the victimized group) are
not fellow human beings but subhumans or animals has also been noted by biologists
and sociologists. Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt regards the ability of humans to demonize
their fellow human beings as their most dangerous characteristic, because only this
can turn them into merciless killers.19
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The dangers of vicious and systematic incitement to racial, ethnic, or religious
hatred are thus readily perceived, and the need to restrict such incitement or to
penalize it in one form or another is widely recognized. The best manner in which to do
so and the precise constituent elements of the act are contested, however, and in
certain countries, notably the United States, the debate is over whether and in what
form it may be restricted at all. This article focuses on assessing the circumstances in
which hate speech can be considered a crime in international law. An analysis of the
philosophical debate surrounding the justifiability of criminalizing hate speech assists
in adequately circumscribing and defining its components and its status under
international law. First, however, a brief overview of the status of hate speech in
human-rights law is provided, since this is where the international debate over hate
speech has generally centered in the past.

Human-Rights Law Prohibitions and Freedom of Speech
Human-rights treaties and declarations place states under an obligation to prevent
and prohibit hate speech. Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for
example, guarantees the right not to be discriminated against and states that ‘‘All are
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration
and against any incitement to such discrimination.’’20 Article 20(2) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) specifically proscribes ‘‘any advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence.’’21 The ICCPR has been widely ratified; as of 18 April 2008, there
are 161 states parties,22 only seven of whom have entered reservations with respect to
art. 20(2).23
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD)24 contains the most extensive and elaborate prohibition of
hate speech, albeit limited to racial grounds.25 It is significant that 173 states are
currently parties to this convention,26 and are thus bound by its provisions.27 Article 4
enjoins states parties to
condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of
superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which
attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and
undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all
incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination.

Specifically, states parties must criminalize ‘‘all dissemination of ideas based on racial
superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence
or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or
ethnic origin.’’28 In requiring states to declare incitement to hatred punishable by
law—that is, to impose individual criminal responsibility for such acts—it goes much
further than art. 20 of the ICCPR, which only obligates states to prohibit such acts.
Prohibiting or otherwise restricting hate speech plainly conflicts with the
important right to freedom of speech. Generally, this right ‘‘include[s] freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of
[one’s] choice.’’29 Its purpose effectively is to protect an individual’s freedom to
communicate in public. ‘‘Communication’’ encompasses ‘‘any act of symbolic expression
undertaken with the intention that it be understood to be that by the public or part of
the public.’’30 In essence, it is ‘‘a right actively to participate in and contribute to the
public culture.’’31
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Freedom of speech is an extremely important right. Natural rights theory as
developed by John Locke, for example, takes as its premise that the human being in a
state of nature is fundamentally free to act, and voluntarily gives up a certain part of
that freedom when entering into a social contract with other human beings.
Consequently, society is justified in restraining people’s only actions insofar as they
injure others.32 John Stuart Mill believed that freedom of speech was a necessary
instrument in the pursuit of the truth.33 Similarly, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
argued in Abrams v. United States that ‘‘the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’’34 Various other
arguments have been advanced in favor of freedom of speech;35 one that appears
particularly relevant in the present context is based on the fact that the language used
to describe the discriminating speech will necessarily be vague, which means that it
may easily be abused.36 Consequently, there are important reasons for prohibiting or
criminalizing only the worst kinds of hate speech, in clearly defined circumstances.
It should be noted, first of all, that certain restrictions on this right have generally
been accepted in domestic jurisdictions, as well as in the jurisprudence of international
courts and adjudicatory bodies such as the UN Human Rights Committee. Even the
United States, traditionally the most outspoken supporter of the right to freedom of
expression, recognizes that limitations are necessary in certain cases, albeit only
where there is an imminent danger of harm.
The European Court of Human Rights has developed an elaborate test designed
to ascertain whether or not a restriction of the right to free speech is justified. Firstly,
the interference with the right must be ‘‘prescribed by law’’: it must have an adequate
basis in domestic law, which means that it must be ‘‘adequately accessible’’
and ‘‘formulated with sufficient precision.’’37 Second, the interference must pursue a
legitimate aim, that is, it must be in the interests of national security, public safety, or
any other of the listed goals. Third, the restriction is subject to a proportionality test: it
must be ‘‘necessary in a democratic society,’’ which has been interpreted to imply that
it must correspond to a ‘‘pressing social need’’ and that it must be ‘‘proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued.’’38 With respect to this balancing exercise, states are accorded
a certain margin of appreciation, which may vary; generally, it is likely to be broad
where a case presents a controversial political, economic, or social issue (e.g., the
control of obscene publications).39
The European Commission on Human Rights has held, in accordance with art. 10
of the European Convention on Human Rights, that freedom of speech can legitimately
be restricted for the purposes of protecting the rights of others. Thus, in X v. Germany,
the commission found that while § 130 of the German Criminal Code, which prohibits
an individual from displaying pamphlets describing the Holocaust as a lie, involved an
interference with the right to freedom of expression, it was founded on the legitimate
purpose of protecting the rights of others, as it was designed to prevent a ‘‘defamatory
attack’’ directed against the Jewish people, individually and as a group.40
The rights most likely to be infringed by hate speech are equality rights,41 such as
the right to be free from discrimination,42 as well as the right to respect for human
dignity. Hate speech denies the members of the victimized group the right to
participate as members of equal worth in the social life of the community of the
state; they are viewed as less worthy, as subhuman, and are thereby excluded.43
It discriminates against them44 and humiliates them, thus violating their human
dignity, a value whose importance is expressly recognized in the Preamble to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
356
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equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world.’’ In the case of hate speech, therefore, a
balancing exercise must be undertaken, weighing the speaker’s interest in being able
to express his opinions freely against the victim’s interest in preserving his or her
human dignity and not being discriminated against.45

The Need to Criminalize Violent and Systematic Hate Speech
While states’ obligation to prohibit hate speech is thus laid down in international
human-rights conventions, under certain circumstances, the dangers of incitement to
hatred and the extent of the responsibility of those who plan and engage in such speech
acts for the ensuing massacres are such that mere human-rights obligations do not
suffice. In certain situations, such obligations are inadequate in terms of preventing
genocides and other ethnically based violence as well as in bringing to justice those
who are properly seen as the true instigators and originators of such crimes. Such
circumstances exist where hate speech is systematically and strategically deployed by
the state or by the leadership of a state-like organization as part of a planned process of
persecution directed against a particular group that is discriminated against on the
basis of its members’ religion, race, or ethnicity.
This article argues in favor of an approach involving the criminalization of
systematic hate speech that is part of a concerted policy of persecution organized by a
state or by a state-like organization. Such an approach respects the important
rationales underlying the right to free speech; moreover, such an approach takes
account of the two most important rationales for limiting hate speech, which are
particularly pregnant in the case of the systematic incitement to hatred at issue here:
the need to prevent the grave violation of human dignity that such speech entails, and
the need to avert the risk of harm.
In the United States, a danger of imminent physical harm has generally been seen
as the only justification for restricting freedom of speech in cases of hate speech. In the
famous 1919 Supreme Court case Schenck v. United States, Justice Holmes formulated
what came to be known as the ‘‘clear and present danger test’’: ‘‘The question in each
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.’’46
Subsequently, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court fine-tuned this theory
by explaining that mere advocacy of violence and crime is not protected where it is
‘‘directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.’’47 Clearly, then, in US jurisprudence, the only justification for
restricting hate speech lies in its inherent danger; where such danger of ‘‘imminent
lawless action’’ is not present, US courts do not regard a restriction of the speech in
question as justified.48
In Germany, the public peace has also been regarded as a fundamental value,
which incitement to hatred is likely to infringe, and has thus provided a justification
for criminalizing hate speech in that country. The justification for limiting hate speech
because of its likelihood to disturb the public peace corresponds, to a certain extent, to
the American concern with ‘‘clear and present danger,’’ in that it is concerned with the
potential consequences of hate speech. The dangerousness of hate speech lies in its
tendency to create a particular culture or climate—a ‘‘specific pattern of popular
assumptions and beliefs stigmatizing specific groups as inferior and harmful.’’49
357

Genocide Studies and Prevention 3:3 December 2008

In Germany and internationally, the need to protect human dignity has been
considered another particularly important reason for criminalizing hate speech. Thus,
in several reports, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has
evoked the ‘‘fundamental principle of respect for human dignity’’ when reminding
states parties of their obligations under the CERD, stressing that this principle
‘‘requires all States to combat dissemination of racial hatred and incitement to racial
hatred.’’50
In Germany, human dignity is specifically mentioned in one of the provisions
criminalizing incitement to hatred: § 130(2) of the German Strafgesetzbuch (StGB), or
Criminal Code, criminalizes incitement to hatred directed against parts of the
population or against a national, racial, religious, or ethnic group by means of public
writings or through the media, as well as attacks on the human dignity of others by
insulting, treating with scorn, or libeling parts of the population or a predetermined
group through the same means of communication. Additionally, § 130(1) makes it a
crime to incite hatred against parts of the population or invite others to commit violent
or arbitrary acts against them,51 or to attack their human dignity by insulting,
maliciously heaping scorn on, or libeling them,52 if this is done in a way that is likely to
disturb the public peace. Thus, the values that are to be protected by § 130 are the
public peace, on the one hand, and human dignity, on the other.
The concept of human dignity is of central importance within the framework of the
German constitution (Grundgesetz) in that human dignity represents the fundamental
principle on which the system of basic rights is founded. It is guaranteed in the first
article of the Grundgesetz, which declares that an individual’s dignity is inviolable.
The German Constitutional Court has held that human dignity cannot be lost through
undignified behavior.53 Moreover, human dignity is not measured against an
individual’s capacity to act in a self-determined way, nor against his or her capacity
to reason, but instead is determined by humanness as such, that is, by the
‘‘menschlichen Sein angelegten potentiellen Fähigkeiten.’’54
Under German law, the definition of an attack against an individual’s human
dignity requires that the people under attack be denied their right to live as persons of
equal worth in the community of the state and that they be treated as beings who are
less worthy. The attack must thus be directed against the core of their personality,
which constitutes their human dignity, and not merely against particular personality
traits.55 Courts have interpreted this requirement differently. While the Frankfurt
District Court (Oberlandesgericht) found in a 1995 case that an attack on human
dignity should primarily be interpreted as a denial of the right to life in a biological
sense, that is, the right to exist as a human being as such,56 the Bavarian District
Court rejected this interpretation, arguing that it is sufficient that the perpetrators
deny the victims their social right to live as people of equal worth in the community.57
It appears that the latter interpretation has been preferred in the literature.58
In order to more fully understand the idea of human dignity and its significance in
the context of hate speech, it is useful to draw on the theories of the philosopher
Avishai Margalit, who has defined dignity as ‘‘the expression of the feeling of respect
persons feel toward themselves as human beings.’’59 Margalit submits that human
beings deserve respect because of their capacity for ‘‘radical freedom,’’ that is, the
ability to ‘‘reevaluat[e] one’s life at any given moment, as well as the ability to change
one’s life from this moment on.’’60 Even the worst criminals are conceivably able to
re-evaluate their lives and decide to live in an honorable manner in the future.
As Margalit explains, ‘‘respecting humans means never giving up on anyone, since all
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people are capable of living dramatically differently from the way they have lived
so far.’’61 By contrast, humiliating human beings consists in treating or seeing them as
‘‘nonhuman’’ or ‘‘subhuman.’’62 Hate speech does exactly this; often it goes even further
and engages in demonization. All these forms of humiliation involve the rejection of an
individual or a group from the ‘‘human commonwealth.’’63 Such a rejection includes the
idea of loss of control; that is, humiliation represents ‘‘the deliberate infliction of utter
loss of freedom and control over one’s vital interests.’’64 Humiliating acts ‘‘show the
victims that they lack even the most minuscule degree of control over their fate—that
they are helpless and subject to the good will (or rather, the bad will) of their
tormentors.’’65 Hate speech, especially when it is part of a concerted state policy of
persecution that also includes a range of other discriminatory measures, has precisely
this effect: it excludes the victim group from the ‘‘human commonwealth’’ by means of
stigmatization and, through its influence on the addressees who are incited to hatred
against the victim group, demonstrates to the latter their utter helplessness and lack
of control. As with other forms of humiliation, there is ‘‘a constant threat of living a life
unworthy of a human being.’’66 This threat is increased exponentially and becomes
imminent when it is the state itself or a similarly powerful organization that engages
in hate propaganda in a systematic manner as part of a general policy to persecute the
victim group.
The idea of humiliation as excluding an individual from the ‘‘human commonwealth’’ is linked with the denial of his or her human rights, which, as we have seen, is
also an effect of hate speech. Human rights are those rights that an individual
possesses merely by virtue of being human, and their denial therefore expresses an
attitude that regards the victim as less than human and consequently conveys his or
her rejection from the human community.67
An exploration of the thought processes and emotions of those who have committed
hate crimes and been actively involved in mass atrocities reveals how the
stigmatization of the victims and their exclusion from the human community enabled
the perpetrators to engage in these acts while simultaneously remaining convinced
that these acts were necessary and, in fact, corresponded to what the prevailing
morality required of them.68 As Harald Welzer writes, many German concentrationcamp officials believed themselves to be decent, upright, and morally correct agents
who, while sending human beings to the gas chambers with no psychological or moral
qualms (either then or later), were nonetheless upset and showed indignation when it
was suggested to them years afterwards that, in their dealings with particular
individuals, they had failed to act with moral integrity.69 For example, to demonstrate
how he had remained a decent and compassionate man, Franz Stangl, the commander
of the Treblinka camp, recounted how he granted a camp inmate’s request for a more
humane death for his father, who had been designated for the gas chamber, thus
easing the father’s (inevitable) death.70 The reason for this paradox lay, to a large
extent, in the fact that they believed themselves to be doing what was necessary, as
well as in the conviction that they were acting against an ‘‘out-group’’ created through
prior stigmatization,71 which, in turn, was achieved primarily by means of hate
propaganda. This conditioning of the minds of the perpetrators, which meant that the
majority of them would not suffer feelings of guilt or other psychological problems,
whereas those victims who survived were plagued by traumata and feelings of guilt
(often for having survived while so many others perished) for years afterwards,72 can
easily be recognized as extremely dangerous. As Welzer argues, the fact that the
perpetrators of genocides and crimes against humanity are socio-psychologically
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normal people is more terrifying than the idea that they might have had any
socialization deficits, that they were sadistic, brutalized, or the like: ‘‘Es war viel
schlimmer: Sie haben einfach etwas getan, von dem sie glaubten, dass es von ihnen
erwartet wurde.’’73 In the case of Nazi Germany, the perpetrators’ minds had been
thoroughly conditioned by the prevailing Nazi morality, without which the genocide
would not have been feasible.74
With these considerations in mind, we now turn to the question of whether hate
speech can, under certain circumstances, also be considered an international crime,
rather than merely being prohibited under international human-rights law. Antonio
Cassese has defined the purpose of allocating an act the status of an international
crime as the protection of ‘‘values considered important by the whole international
community and consequently binding all States and individuals.’’75 As there is
therefore a ‘‘universal interest in repressing these crimes,’’ they are prima facie subject
to universal jurisdiction.76 An argument can therefore be made that were hate speech
considered an international crime, it could be prevented and stigmatized more
effectively. It is submitted, however, that only the worst kind of hate speech ought to
be considered an international crime, for various reasons. First, this is necessary in
order to protect the important right to freedom of speech from excessive infringement.
Second, because international crimes are the worst kinds of crimes, including mass
killings and atrocities such as genocide and crimes against humanity, anything but the
worst and most dangerous hate speech would not be comparable in gravity with
the other international crimes, and consequently would not deserve to be placed in the
same category. Lastly, it makes sense to deal with hate propaganda of a lesser degree
through prohibition rather than criminalization, as this arguably allows for more
effective prevention. This is because the burden of proof is much higher in the case of
crimes than in the case of civil law prohibitions; while the prosecutor’s burden in a
criminal case is to prove his or her case beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of proof in
a civil law case is the balance of probabilities.

Hate Speech as the Crime against Humanity of Persecution
The Elements of Persecution
The most adequate and sound approach to the criminalization of systematic hate
speech is to treat it as the crime against humanity of persecution. In Kunarac, the
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) outlined the different chapeau elements of crimes against humanity.77 First,
there must be an attack, which has been said to encompass ‘‘any mistreatment of the
civilian population.’’78 Second, the accused’s acts must be part of the attack; this does
not mean that they must be committed in the midst of the attack but, rather, requires
that they not be isolated acts.79 Third, the attack must be directed against a civilian
population. It need not be directed against the entire population, but it must be
directed against a population rather than ‘‘a limited and randomly selected number of
individuals.’’80 The population must be the primary object, not an incidental target.81
Fourth, the attack must be widespread or systematic. While ‘‘widespread’’ alludes to
the ‘‘large-scale nature of the attack and the number of victims,’’ ‘‘systematic’’ denotes
the ‘‘organised nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random
occurrence.’’82 Fifth, the perpetrator’s acts must form part of a pattern of widespread
or systematic crimes directed against the civilian population, and the perpetrator must
know that his or her acts fit into such a pattern. The perpetrator must possess the
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intent to commit the underlying offense and know that, or be reckless as to whether,
his or her acts form part of the attack.83
The crime of persecution has been recognized as a crime against humanity since
the Statute of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. In Kordic´ and
Cˇerkez, the ICTY Appeals Chamber summarized the elements of this crime, explaining
that persecution consists of any act or omission that discriminates in fact, denies or
infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in either treaty or customary law, and is
carried out deliberately with the intention to discriminate on a listed ground.84 The
listed grounds in the Statutes of the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) are political, racial, and religious grounds,85 while the Statute of the
International Criminal Court adds ‘‘national, ethnic, cultural, gender [. . .] or other
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.’’86
Furthermore, the acts must be of a gravity equal to that of other crimes against
humanity. They can reach such a level of gravity if their effects are similar.87
Therefore, acts of persecution must be evaluated ‘‘in their context by looking at their
cumulative effect.’’88 The protected interest in the case of persecution has been held to
lie in all ‘‘elementary and inalienable rights of man.’’89 This is implicit in the definition
of ‘‘persecution’’ laid down in the Rome Statute, which describes it as ‘‘the intentional
and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason
of the identity of the group or collectivity.’’90
The Tadic´ Trial Chamber found that persecution included a large variety
of acts that could, inter alia, be physical, economic, or judicial, so long as they
infringed upon an individual’s right to equal enjoyment of his or her fundamental
rights.91

Hate Speech as Persecution
International tribunals have recognized that hate speech can, if certain conditions are
fulfilled, constitute the crime against humanity of persecution. In fact, this treatment
of vicious hate propaganda goes back to the Nuremberg trials. The Nuremberg
Tribunal convicted Julius Streicher, founder and editor of the anti-Semitic propagandist newspaper Der Stürmer, holding that his
incitement to murder and extermination at a time when Jews in the East were being
killed under the most horrible conditions clearly constitutes persecution on political and
racial grounds [. . .] and constitutes a Crime against Humanity.92

Of course, in that case, it was incitement to crimes—‘‘murder and extermination’’—
that was considered to constitute persecution, whereas the present argument is that
incitement to hatred should be regarded as persecution.
Similarly, the ICTR found in Ruggiu that the accused had committed acts of
persecution, namely
direct and public radio broadcasts all aimed at singling out and attacking the Tutsi
ethnic group and Belgians on discriminatory grounds, by depriving them of the
fundamental rights to life, liberty and basic humanity enjoyed by members of wider
society. The deprivation of these rights can be said to have as its aim the death and
removal of those persons from the society in which they live alongside the perpetrators,
or eventually even from humanity itself.93

Ruggiu was convicted of both persecution and direct and public incitement to genocide
for the same acts. What is particularly important about the cited paragraph is that the
tribunal recognized the particular evil of hate speech, which lies not only in the danger
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that it may lead to further crimes but in the fact that it severely violates the victims’
human dignity by rejecting them from the society in which they live and, eventually,
even from the ‘‘human commonwealth’’ itself.
The United States Military Tribunal in the Ministries Case, in its judgment
convicting Otto Dietrich, a Nazi propagandist who held the post of Reich press chief
from 1937 and state secretary of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and
Propaganda under Joseph Goebbels from 1938 to 1945, appeared to go farther. It
convicted Dietrich of crimes against humanity, holding that he implemented such
crimes and participated in them through his anti-Semitic press and periodical
directives.94
The case of Hans Fritzsche, one of the accused before the Nuremberg Tribunal, is
particularly interesting. Fritzsche, a senior official in the Ministry of Popular
Enlightenment and Propaganda and head of the ministry’s Radio Division, had been
charged with crimes against humanity for having ‘‘incited and encouraged the
commission of War Crimes by deliberately falsifying news to arouse in the German
People those passions which led them to the commission of atrocities.’’95 The tribunal
acquitted him, explaining, inter alia, that it was ‘‘not prepared to hold that [his
broadcasts] were intended to incite the German people to commit atrocities on
conquered peoples.’’96 Subsequently, however, a German court convicted Fritzsche and
sentenced him to nine years’ forced labor.97 The conviction was upheld by the court of
appeals, which found that although Fritzsche had not directly called for the
persecution or extermination of the Jewish people, he had nonetheless contributed
in a significant way to the creation of an atmosphere among the German people that
favored such persecution and extermination.98 The German court thus recognized that
Fritzsche’s hate speech was an integral part and, indeed, a supporting pillar of the
Nazis’ system of persecution.
The Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide prepared
by the UN Secretariat in 1947 also included an article criminalizing ‘‘[a]ll forms of
public propaganda tending by their systematic and hateful character to provoke
genocide, or tending to make it appear as a necessary, legitimate or excusable act.’’99
Hate propaganda was considered punishable where it was ‘‘charged with hatred’’ and
‘‘systematic, that is to say, repeated methodically,’’ as well as public.100 Comments
made by delegates during the Sixteenth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, which
had been established by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to prepare a
draft genocide convention taking into consideration, inter alia, the Secretariat’s draft
convention, confirm this view.101 In arguing in favor of the criminalization of such
propaganda, delegates appear to have been motivated by the need to prevent
widespread and systematic propaganda of the kind employed by Nazi Germany.102
These characteristics of propaganda closely correspond to the chapeau requirement
of crimes against humanity that the acts committed be part of a ‘‘widespread
or systematic attack,’’ the public nature of hate propaganda rendering it likely to be
widespread.
During the subsequent debates in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly,
remarks by the Polish delegate arguing in favor of the incitement provision indicate
that he viewed such incitement as a form of persecution:
[H]ow could protection against incitement to genocide be denied to certain groups,
particularly in view of the fact that the groups to be protected by the convention were
for the most part extremely weak and helpless to defend themselves against their
persecutors?103
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Various other representatives also insisted on the dangers of propaganda and the need
to penalize it.104 Nonetheless, the Soviet amendment was decisively rejected,105 and
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as finally
adopted did not contain a provision criminalizing hate propaganda.
That hate propaganda can amount to persecution was explicitly recognized in the
Jud Süß Case, which in 1949 came before the Oberster Gerichtshof für die Britische
Zone, the predecessor of the German Supreme Court. The accused was a well-known
film director who had frequently been given special tasks by the Goebbels as minister
for propaganda.106 He was, moreover, the co-author and director of the film Jud Süß,
and in that capacity was charged with having committed a crime against humanity.
The Court characterized the film as a ‘‘judenfeindlicher Hetzfilm,’’ that is, an antiSemitic film the purpose of which was to stir up hatred.107 It held that one of the
hallmarks of the crime against humanity of persecution is that any particular act
constituting persecution is an integral part of the general persecution.108 It was
sufficient that the film aggravated the persecution of Jewish people in Germany for it
to be seen as having caused their mistreatment. It therefore amounted to persecution
as a crime against humanity. The damage or harm of the film lay in the fact that, first,
it further denigrated the Jewish people in the opinion of the public, thereby
fundamentally infringing their human rights; and, second, it incited others to
commit their own acts of persecution or, at least, to acquiesce in persecutory acts.109
Moreover, it was clear that the act of the accused—that is, the production of the film—
consciously created one of the means of persecution that the Nazi regime made
systematic use of.110 According to the Court, the ‘‘Mitursächlichkeit des Films für die
Judenverfolgung durch hetzerische Beeinflussung der öffentlichen Meinung im
judenfeindlichen Sinne als einer wichtigen Grundlage der Verfolgung und
Schädigung der Juden’’111 was clear.112 The Oberste Gerichtshof recognized and
emphasized that it was the general persecution, involving massive and relentless
state-organized propaganda, as well as the repression of the opinions of those
who thought differently, that was successful and, indeed, necessary to effect the
conditioning of the Germans, to turn them against their Jewish fellow citizens, and to
prevent any empathetic identification with the victims’ fate.113 The Court thus
underlined the crucial role of hate speech in making possible the persecutory measures
that followed. Indeed, hate speech is indispensable for the realization of other
persecutory acts: this is why hate speech must accompany other persecutory acts and
is usually accompanied by other persecutory acts.
More than fifty years later, in 2003, the ICTR confirmed in Nahimana et al. that
incitement to hatred can be a form of persecution.114 The three accused in that case all
held leading positions in the Rwandan media before and during the genocide of 1994.
Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza were co-founders of the notorious
Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), and Barayagwiza was also a
founding member of the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR) party, while
Hassan Ngeze, a journalist, was the founder and editor-in-chief of the newspaper
Kangura and also a founding member of the CDR party. The ICTR Trial Chamber
found that ‘‘hate speech targeting a population on the basis of ethnicity, or other
discriminatory grounds,’’ reaches the same level of gravity as the other acts that
constitute crimes against humanity, and therefore amounts to persecution.115
The Trial Chamber specifically pointed out that hate speech ‘‘destroys the dignity of
those in the group under attack’’ and emphasized that it can cause ‘‘irreversible
harm.’’116 It distinguished hate speech as persecution from incitement, explaining that
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persecution ‘‘is defined also in terms of impact,’’ and ‘‘is not a provocation to cause
harm,’’ but ‘‘is itself the harm.’’117 This definition corresponds to that expounded above,
that hate speech as such is harmful, in that it represents an attack on someone’s
dignity and humiliates the victims, and that its evil therefore does not depend on its
potential to spark off acts of physical violence. The Trial Chamber explained further
that the writings of Kangura and the broadcasts of RTLM ‘‘condition[ed] the Hutu
population and creat[ed] a climate of harm,’’ thereby giving birth to ‘‘the conditions for
extermination and genocide in Rwanda.’’118 Moreover, it held that ‘‘persecution is
broader than direct and public incitement, including advocacy of ethnic hatred in other
forms.’’119 Here the Trial Chamber thus went a step further than it did in Ruggiu,
where it found that incitement to genocide constituted persecution. As an example
of hate speech amounting to persecution, the judgment mentions the Kangura article
‘‘A Cockroach Cannot Give Birth to a Butterfly,’’120 which reads in part:
A cockroach gives birth to another cockroach. [. . .] A Tutsi is someone who has a sweet
tongue but whose wickedness is indescribable. A Tutsi is someone whose desire for
revenge is insatiable; someone who is unpredictable, someone who laughs whereas he is
suffering. In our language, a Tutsi is called cockroach because he takes advantage of the
night to achieve his objectives. The word Inyenzi is a reminder of the redoubtable snake
whose venom is extremely poisonous.121

The Trial Chamber’s findings were recently largely upheld by the ICTR Appeals
Chamber, which found that hate speech directed against a group and inspired by
discriminatory motives—whether on the basis of ethnicity or any other basis—violates
the right to respect for the human dignity of the members of the group and thus
constitutes discrimination in fact.122 The Appeals Chamber opined that it is not
necessary to decide whether hate speech that does not incite violence against members
of an ethnic group is in itself of a gravity equivalent to that of other crimes against
humanity.123 It emphasized that each underlying act of persecution need not be of a
gravity equal to that of other crimes against humanity, because the underlying
persecutory acts can be considered together; the cumulative effect of all the underlying
persecutory acts must to be of equal gravity as the other crimes against humanity.124
Furthermore, the context in which the underlying acts were committed is ‘‘particularly
important’’ in determining their gravity.125 The Appeals Chamber thus correctly and
significantly stressed the importance of context and the need to consider all
persecutory and discriminatory acts in their entirety and to look at their cumulative
effect. It found that the hate speech disseminated in Rwanda after 6 April 1994 was
accompanied by calls for genocide of the Tutsi ethnic group and that all the incitement
to hatred took place in the context of an extensive campaign of persecution directed
against the Tutsi population, which was also characterized by acts of violence and
destruction of property.126 Considered in this context, the hate speech was of a gravity
equal to that of other crimes against humanity.
The Supreme Court of Canada has also held that hate speech can amount to the
crime against humanity of persecution. In Mugesera v. Canada,127 the Supreme Court
had to decide whether to reinstate a deportation order against an active member of a
radical Hutu party who in 1993 had successfully applied for permanent residence in
Canada. The deportation order had been issued under s. 27 of the Immigration Act on
the basis of a speech Mugesera had given in Rwanda in 1992, and with which,
Canada’s minister of citizenship and immigration had decided, he had incited murder,
genocide, and hatred, thereby committing a crime against humanity. Section 27 of the
Immigration Act provides for the removal after admission of a permanent resident who
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‘‘is a member of an inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)’’;128 Section 19(1)(j)
of the same act provides that no one is to be granted admission with regard to whom
there are ‘‘reasonable grounds to believe’’ that he or she has ‘‘committed an act or
omission outside Canada that constituted a war crime or a crime against humanity
within the meaning of subsection 7(3.76) of the Criminal Code and that, if it had been
committed in Canada, would have constituted an offence against the laws of Canada.’’
The Court held that the deportation order had been valid and should be reinstated.129
Defining the elements of the crime of incitement to hatred, laid down in s. 319 of
the Criminal Code of Canada, the Supreme Court held that ‘‘wilful promotion of
hatred’’ required that the accused ‘‘[have] had as a conscious purpose the promotion
of hatred against the identifiable group, or [that] he or she foresaw that the promotion
of hatred against that group was certain to result and nevertheless communicated the
statements.’’130 Moreover, the speaker had to ‘‘desire that the message stir up hatred,’’
even though it need not be proven that the statements actually resulted in the stirring
up of hatred.131 With respect to the actus reus, the Court found that ‘‘hatred’’
refers to ‘‘emotion of an intense and extreme nature that is clearly associated
with vilification and detestation,’’132 while ‘‘promoting’’ is equivalent to ‘‘actively
support[ing] or instigat[ing]’’ and requires ‘‘[m]ore than mere encouragement.’’133
In order to determine whether or not Mugesera’s statement expressed hatred, the
Court considered ‘‘the understanding of a reasonable person in the context,’’134 that is,
‘‘the speech’s audience and [. . .] its social and historical context.’’135 The Court then
turned to consider the elements of crimes against humanity.136
Finally, the Court turned to the question of whether incitement of hatred could
amount to a crime against humanity, and specifically persecution. Finding that ‘‘the
criminal act of persecution is the gross or blatant denial of a fundamental right on
discriminatory grounds,’’137 the Court discussed ICTR and ICTY case law, finding that
the ICTR’s holding in Ruggiu suggests that ‘‘hate speech always denies fundamental
rights’’ and that ‘‘[t]he equality and the life, liberty and security of the person of targetgroup members cannot but be affected.’’138 The Court reasoned that in certain cases,
such denial of fundamental rights may be of a gravity equal to that of the other acts
enumerated as crimes against humanity.139 Applying this reasoning to the particular
case at hand, the Court concluded,
A speech such as Mr. Mugesera’s, which actively encouraged ethnic hatred, murder and
extermination and which created in its audience a sense of imminent threat and the
need to act violently against an ethnic minority and against political opponents, bears
the hallmarks of a gross or blatant act of discrimination equivalent in severity to the
other underlying acts [. . .]. The criminal act requirement for persecution is therefore
met.140

Having found that at the time of Mugesera’s speech a systematic attack directed
against Tutsi and moderate Hutu was taking place in Rwanda, that the speech was
directed against those groups, and that ‘‘[a] persecutory speech which encourages
hatred and violence against a targeted group furthers an attack against that group,’’
the Court held that the speech ‘‘not only objectively furthered the attack, but also fit
into a pattern of abuse prevailing at that time,’’ and consequently was part of ‘‘a
systematic attack directed against a civilian population that was occurring in Rwanda
at the time.’’141
In denying the human rights of the target group—particularly the right to be free
from discrimination and the right to respect for one’s human dignity—hate speech is
particularly suited to be regarded as the crime against humanity of persecution,
365

Genocide Studies and Prevention 3:3 December 2008

provided that it is systematic and is steered by the government or a similarly powerful
organization. Hate propaganda supports and furthers a climate in which the
commission of violent acts against the victim community is regarded as acceptable
and even necessary, thus encouraging any widespread or systematic attack directed
against the victim group.
This conclusion is reinforced by the considerations developed above with respect to
freedom of speech concerns, where it was submitted that only the most aggravated and
truly dangerous hate speech should be regarded as a crime under international law.
There are valid reasons for allowing hate speech up to a certain level of gravity.
It could be argued, for example, that those who engage in hate speech largely end up
discrediting themselves if they are allowed to do so in public. However, whether or not
this is the case depends to a considerable extent on the surrounding circumstances and
the context in which the hate speech is uttered, that is, the overall state and the
generally accepted particular morality prevalent in the society in question, as well as
on the identity of the speaker. Where the underlying morality generally accepted by
the majority of a society is characterized by tolerance, civic courage, and philanthropy,
then any racist or xenophobic speech will of course be broadly received with
expressions of disgust and disbelief and will not be taken seriously; in such a case,
publicly disseminated hate speech will indeed discredit those who engage in it.142
On the other hand, where a society is out of balance and characterized by a particular
morality marked by homophobia, racism, or ethnic or religious hatred and antagonism,
hate speech is particularly dangerous, and the humiliation of members of the victim
group, as well as the injury to their dignity, is particularly grave. Their vulnerability,
in such a situation, is immense. Such a moral climate is generally the product of
systematic persecution covering all areas of social and private life, directed against a
specific group and organized by the leadership of the state or by a similar state-like
organization. In order to prevent such systematic persecution, as well as worse
victimization, of specific groups—up to and including genocide— it is necessary to
criminalize hate propaganda organized by a state or by a similarly powerful non-state
actor, in a systematic manner, as part of a concerted system of persecution involving a
large variety of exclusionary measures. Aside from incitement to hatred, these include,
inter alia, discriminatory legislation, forcible expulsion, deprivation of citizenship, and
prohibition of intermarriage between members of the persecuted group and the rest of
the population.
In Nahimana, as indicated above, the ICTR Appeals Chamber conclusively upheld
the Trial Chamber’s most important findings on this point, confirming that hate
speech constitutes the denial of certain fundamental rights. The Appeals Chamber has
explicitly recognized that hate speech involves the denial of the right to respect for the
human dignity of the group under attack and constitutes discrimination in fact. It has
found that where hate speech occurs together with other underlying persecutory acts,
such as destruction of property and violence, and where, as a whole, their effect is
equally grave as other crimes against humanity, a conviction for persecution on the
basis of hate speech is appropriate.
In a number of cases, moreover, both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber
of the ICTY have explicitly found that persecution consists not only of acts of physical
violence but also, for instance, of such acts as destruction of property and enactment of
discriminatory laws.143 Importantly, the persecutory measures imposed and executed
by such criminal regimes typically also involve a concerted attack on the right to
freedom of speech. This fact was explicitly recognized by the Oberster Gerichtshof für
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die Britische Zone, the same German court that convicted the director of the film Jud
Süß. The Court found that the violent repression of political speech and attacks
against members of a particular political party, in this case members of the Social
Democratic Party, which opposed Hitler—effectively, acts of persecution directed
against members of a political group—denied their most basic and natural human
rights and amounted to crimes against humanity.144 The post–World War II
jurisprudence therefore recognizes the central role that suppression of freedom of
opinion and expression played in the Nazi system of terror and persecution. The denial
of the right to express opinions hostile to the Nazi regime was intrinsic to the
persecution, which in itself, of course, represented the expulsion of undesirable
‘‘others’’ from German society. Similarly, the Court found in the Case against L. et al.
that a dishonorable pillorying or exhibition of victims was dehumanizing and
amounted to a crime against humanity.145 The accused, members of the
Sturmabteilung (SA) or ‘‘Brownshirts,’’ forced a member of the Social Democratic
Party and a Jewish member of the community to take part in an SA procession, during
which they forced their victims to wear plates around their necks bearing dishonorable
inscriptions (including the word ‘‘Schieber’’—‘‘grafter’’ or ‘‘profiteer’’) and to be driven
around in a pig-cart.146 These actions were part of a systematic persecution of Jewish
people that had found its general expression in a boycott of Jewish stores in April
1933.147 It was typical of this persecution, which was executed through a system of
lawlessness, arbitrariness, and violence, that the victims had no recourse to effective
legal protection and were helpless to prevent what was in store for them.148 One of the
purposes of the system was to disseminate fear and terror, thereby suppressing all
indications of resistance against National Socialism wherever they arose, as well as to
render impossible any freedom of expression and thus to uphold the pretense of unified
approval on the part of the German people.149 Here the Court’s judgment underscores
the fact that suppression of freedom of opinion is typically also part of a system of
persecution—this is important, and it indicates where the real dangers of illegitimate
restrictions of freedom of expression lie. It also reveals the vital importance of freedom
of expression. Illegitimate limitations of freedom of expression can themselves involve
a violation of human dignity.
Systematic, persecutory hate speech is clearly harmful, as it is an inherent part of
the persecutory policy, supporting, justifying, and furthering any other persecutory
measures that the regime in question may be pursuing vis-à-vis the victim group. It is
intrinsically harmful because it serves to further degrade and humiliate individuals
who are subject to various other acts of exclusion and dehumanization, including laws
depriving them of their citizenship and denying them access to various professions;
expropriation of their property; and forced expulsion or being compelled them to live in
ghettos, separate from other members of the wider community—all of which measures
suggest to them that they are less valuable than the rest of the community and
that the community needs to be protected from their harmful influence. Moreover, the
primary underlying purpose of the right to freedom of speech is to protect
the individual against repression by the state. In the type of case that the approach
advocated here purports to address, it is the state or a state-like organization which
itself engages in incitement to hatred.
Nor is such hate speech in any way conducive to discovery of the truth. In the cases
envisaged here, the marketplace of ideas has been destroyed by the state itself—
freedom of expression is suppressed at the same time that hatred against the
persecuted group is being stirred up. Furthermore, because only the most vicious and
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organized hate speech would be criminalized, the danger that such criminalization
could lead to abuse as a result of vague language or a too broad interpretation is very
slim indeed.

Conclusion
History shows that hate speech typically precedes public incitement to violence and
specific criminal acts, including genocide. All are part of and support an organized
system of persecution that includes a variety of measures. The instigation of and
specific calls for criminal acts, such as genocide, is not likely to be successful unless a
climate of violence has first been created by means of hate speech.
Such a climate is achieved primarily through the demonization and dehumanization of opponents, which invariably involves a violation of their human dignity through
a process of humiliation equivalent to the victim group’s expulsion from the human
community. Vicious and systematic state-orchestrated hate speech and propaganda
must be criminalized, both because they violate human dignity, which in turn is closely
connected with an infringement of the victim group’s right to life, equality, and nondiscrimination, and because of the inherent danger grounded in hate speech’s crucial
position on the ‘‘continuum of destruction.’’ Hate speech is an integral and crucial part
of any persecutory process; it plays its part through the psychological conditioning of
the perpetrators.
I have argued here that criminalization of incitement to hatred is best achieved by
treating it as the crime against humanity of persecution. Dealing with it in such a way
would also answer concerns about freedom of speech, because incitement to hatred
would amount to persecution only if the other requirements of crimes against
humanity are fulfilled—in particular, that the words in question be part of a
‘‘widespread or systematic attack.’’ Hate speech that is less grave and that does not
occur in the context of a widespread or systematic attack cannot be considered to
amount to persecution and can therefore be dealt with only by means of a prohibition
under international human-rights law.
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